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261 
TREMENDOUS UPSIDE POTENTIAL: HOW A 
HIGH-SCHOOL BASKETBALL PLAYER MIGHT 
CHALLENGE THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL 
ASSOCIATION’S ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1995, the Minnesota Timberwolves, a franchise in the National 
Basketball Association (NBA, or ―the League‖), selected Kevin Garnett 
with the fifth pick of the NBA Draft.
1
 Garnett was a prodigious basketball 
player who had just graduated from high school.
2
 Still playing in the NBA 
today, Garnett has won the Most Valuable Player award and the Defensive 
Player of the Year award, and he has been selected for the NBA All-Star 
Game thirteen times.
3
 Garnett has appeared on one of the All-NBA teams 
nine times, a yearly honor bestowed upon the best fifteen players in the 
League by journalists who cover the NBA.
4
 He also has won an NBA 
championship
5
 and is all but assured of enshrinement in the Basketball 
Hall of Fame when he retires.
6
 
Garnett is one of several current players who entered the NBA straight 
from high school, eschewing the traditional path of enrolling in college, 
developing stronger basketball skills as an amateur, and then seeking to 
join the League.
7
 Though just a plurality, this group counts several 
prominent stars among its members, and entering the NBA immediately 
following high-school graduation is no longer a curiosity.
8
 Many NBA 
 
 
 1. Draft results are available at 1995 NBA Draft, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www. 
basketball-reference.com/draft/NBA_1995.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). Basketball-Reference is a 
website that compiles official NBA statistics and facts, including year-by-year draft results. The site is 
regarded as a reliable database by authorities including The Wall Street Journal. See David Biderman, 
The Count: Fire Up the Simulator—It’s NBA Prediction Time, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2009, at W4. 
 2. Harvey Araton, Sports of the Times: Ah, to Be Young, Gifted and Drafted, N.Y. TIMES, June 
29, 1995, at B9. 
 3. Garnett‘s player biography, including honors received and awards won, is available at Kevin 
Garnett, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketballreference.com/players/g/garneke01.html 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 4. Best on Offense (Durant), Defense (Howard) Pace All-NBA Team, NBA NEWS, http://www. 
nba.com/2010/news/05/06/all.nba/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2010). 
 5. 2007–08 Boston Celtics Roster and Statistics, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www. 
basketball-reference.com/teams/BOS/2008.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 6. Chris Tomasson, Hall of Fame Door Assessed, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 29, 2008, http:// 
www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2008/feb/29/tomasson-hall-fame-door-assessed/. 
 7. Pete Thamel, At 19, Plotting New Path to N.B.A., via Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at 
A1. 
 8. Other prominent current players who have pursued this career path include Kobe Bryant of 
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players who entered the League immediately following high school have 
earned the highest honors and ascended to preeminence.
9
 For example, 
Kobe Bryant and LeBron James, NBA icons, have both won the Most 
Valuable Player award.
10
 Last season, James, Bryant, and another star who 
came straight from high school, Dwight Howard, were three of the five 
players selected for the All-NBA First Team.
11
 Using these metrics, 
commonly regarded as the currency required for basketball immortality,
12
 
so-called ―prep-to-pros‖ players have demonstrated that they not only can 
compete in the NBA, but also that they can stand among the best players 
in the League.
13
 
 
 
the Los Angeles Lakers, see Kobe Bryant, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/playerfile/kobe_bryant/ 
index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010), LeBron James of the Miami Heat, see LeBron James, 
NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/playerfile/lebron_james/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010), 
Dwight Howard of the Orlando Magic, see Dwight Howard, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/player 
file/dwight_howard/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010), Amar‘e Stoudemire of the New York 
Knicks, see Amar’e Stoudemire, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/playerfile/amare_stoudemire/index. 
html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010), Tracy McGrady of the Detroit Pistons, see Tracy McGrady, 
NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/playerfile/tracy_mcgrady/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010), and 
Jermaine O‘Neal of the Boston Celtics, see Jermaine O’Neal, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/ 
playerfile/jermaine_oneal/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 9. Each of the players mentioned in note 8 has been selected for multiple all-star games. Bryant 
has appeared in twelve all-star games, see Kobe Bryant NBA & ABA Statistics, BASKETBALL-
REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/b/bryanko01.html (last visited Aug. 
23, 2010); James has appeared in six all-star games, see Lebron James NBA & ABA Statistics, 
BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/j/jamesle01.html (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2010); Howard has appeared in four all-star games, see Dwight Howard NBA & ABA 
Statistics, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/h/howardw 
01.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010); Stoudemire has appeared in five all-star games, see Amar’s 
Stoudemire NBA & ABA Statistics, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference. 
com/players/s/ stoudam01.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010); McGrady has appeared in seven all-star 
games, see Tracy McGrady NBA & ABA Statistics, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www. 
basketball-reference.com/players/m/mcgratr01.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010); and O‘Neal has 
appeared in six all-star games, see Jermaine O’Neal NBA & ABA Statistics, BASKETBALL-
REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/o/onealje01.html (last visited Aug. 23, 
2010). Each player also has received at least one maximum-value contract, a common recognition of a 
player‘s exceptional ability. See Sean Deveney, Op-Ed., Roy Will Be Worth Every Penny to Blazers, 
NBC SPORTS, Aug. 6, 2009, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/32322396/ns/sports-nba/; Stan McNeal, 
With Gasol, Lakers Now Have NBA’s Best Lineup, SPORTING NEWS, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www. 
sportingnews.com/nba/article/2008-02-01/with-gasol-lakers-now-have-nbas-best-lineup. Larry Coon 
provides an explanation of the NBA salary cap and the maximum-compensation structure. See Larry 
Coon, Larry Coon’s NBA Salary Cap FAQ, CBAFAQ.COM, http://members.cox.net/lmcoon/salary 
cap.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2010).  
 10. See Kobe Bryant, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/ 
players/b/bryanko01.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010); LeBron James, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, 
http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/j/jamesle01.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 11. See supra note 4. 
 12. See Tomasson, supra note 6. 
 13. See supra note 4. 
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A preternaturally gifted high-school basketball player no longer can 
plan to follow this career model, though. Adopted in advance of the 2006 
NBA Draft, the NBA implemented new eligibility rules in 2005.
14
 These 
rules, commonly known as the ―age requirement,‖ stipulate that no player 
is eligible to participate in the League unless he will be nineteen years old 
during the calendar year of the draft and at least one NBA season will have 
been completed since his high-school class graduated.
15
 
Upon enactment, the NBA‘s age limitation joined the age requirement 
of the National Football League (NFL) as one of the only two rules of this 
kind among American professional sports leagues.
16
 No other American 
sport so severely restricts who can participate and when they are eligible to 
do so.
17
 For the NBA, the newest age rules were merely the latest iteration 
of an ongoing effort to closely regulate how players enter the League.
18
 
Since its adoption in 2005, the NBA‘s age requirement has created 
controversy among seemingly all of the League‘s most notable 
constituencies—current players, aspiring players, team management, 
college coaches, fans.
19
 An expansive discussion of its efficacy remains 
ongoing.
20
 The inextricable links among the social, educational, and 
 
 
 14. Jack N.E. Pitts, Jr., Comment, Why Wait?: An Antitrust Analysis of the National Football 
League and National Basketball Association’s Draft Eligibility Rules, 51 HOW. L.J. 433, 435 (2008). 
 15. The age requirement is codified in the collective bargaining agreement negotiated between 
the NBA and the National Basketball Players Association. See NBA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT, ARTICLE X (2005), available at http://www.nbpa.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%20X. 
pdf [hereinafter ARTICLE X]. It reads in pertinent part: 
A player shall be eligible for selection in the . . . NBA Draft . . . [if]: (i) The player (A) is or 
will be at least 19 years of age during the calendar year in which the Draft is held, and (B) . . . 
at least one (1) NBA Season has elapsed since the player‘s graduation from high school (or, if 
the player did not graduate from high school, since the graduation of the class with which the 
player would have graduated had he graduated from high school) . . . . 
Id. 
 16. Michael A. McCann & Joseph S. Rosen, Legality of Age Restrictions in the NBA and the 
NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 731 (2006). 
 17. Id. 
 18. For a discussion of the NBA‘s history regulating player eligibility, see id. at 732–33; see also 
Michael A. McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School Players from 
the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 113, 129–34 (2004). 
 19. See, e.g., Oscar Robertson, Op-Ed., The N.B.A.’s Dropouts, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2007, at 
A21 (former player discussing the age requirement); Michael Rothstein, Izzo Issues Call for Change, 
JOURNAL GAZETTE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), May 29, 2008, http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20080529/SPORTS/805290307 (Michigan State University men‘s basketball coach Tom 
Izzo objects to the rule); Thamel, supra note 7 (discussing options available to high-school players 
who do not want to attend college). 
 20. A representative forum for this discussion can be found online at the prominent basketball 
blog FreeDarko. See Celebrate the New Dark Age, FREEDARKO.COM (Nov. 8, 2009), http://freedarko. 
blogspot.com/2009/11/celebrate-new-dark-age.html. FreeDarko is a website that examines the events 
of the NBA in a context that focuses its inquiries upon styles of play; social and cultural factors 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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commercial elements implicated by the policy, along with the fervor 
connected to these subjects, have sustained the intense scrutiny focused on 
an age restriction.
21
 The issue retains particular salience because high-
school basketball players who do not wish to attend college are now 
regularly introducing novel solutions to the problem created for them by 
the rule.
22
 
Remaining unresolved amid this impassioned dialogue is an important 
legal question that this Note will address: could a prospective prep-to-pros 
player find the legal footing required to challenge the rule successfully? 
 
 
expressed through these styles; and the intermingling of social and cultural elements connected to the 
NBA as expressed through League rules and customs. FreeDarko‘s staff recently published a well-
received book about basketball style. See BETHLEHEM SHOALS ET AL., THE MACROPHENOMENAL PRO 
BASKETBALL ALMANAC (2008). For a discussion of this book, see, for example, Fred Bierman & 
Benjamin Hoffman, Q & A: The Voices of FreeDarko Speak Out, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/20/sports/basketball/20dribble.html. In addition, one can see that the 
objections remain unabated. In the summer of 2009, U.S. Congressman Steve Cohen (D-Tenn.) sent a 
letter to the NBA, asking Commissioner David Stern to repeal the rule. Cohen has called the rule a 
―vestige of slavery.‖ Pete Thamel, Congressman Asks N.B.A. and Union to Rescind Age Minimum for 
Players, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/sports/basketball/04web 
cohen.html; see also Tom Ziller, NBA Age Limit Isn’t Fair, Doesn’t Work, NBA FANHOUSE BLOG, 
July 22, 2009, http://nba.fanhouse.com/2009/07/22/nba-age-limit-isnt-fair-doesnt-work/. 
 21. The focus of this Note is the legal framework in which an aspiring prep-to-pros basketball 
player could mount a challenge to the NBA age requirement. The discussion examines antitrust law 
and the corresponding legal precedents that a court would have to consider. There are additional 
questions that one might ask about the NBA age requirement, though. These include whether it creates 
a disparate racial impact upon those most likely to incur its effects; whether the league engages in a 
form of paternalism by effectively encouraging basketball players to attend college as a compulsory 
measure; and whether the NBA should be a monolithic arbiter of how basketball players of exceptional 
ability can contract for their services. Addressing these and other questions in the thorough fashion 
each deserves is beyond the ambit of this Note. For some discussion of these questions, see generally 
McCann, supra note 18; Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and 
Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71 (2008); Jordan 
Michael Rossen, The NBA’s Age Minimum and its Effect on High School Phenoms, 8 VA. SPORTS & 
ENT. L.J. 173 (2008).  
 22. As a result of the age requirement, highly touted high-school point guard Brandon Jennings 
chose to play professional basketball in Italy for a year following his graduation from high school in 
2008. See Thamel, supra note 7. He chose this route as an alternative to attending college, the most 
obvious domestic option and a previously de facto compulsory requirement. Id. He returned to the 
United States for the 2009 NBA Draft and was selected in the first round by the Milwaukee Bucks. See 
2009 NBA Draft, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-reference.com/draft/NBA_ 
2009.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). Following a similar path, prep player Jeremy Tyler chose to 
leave high school after his junior year and play professional basketball in Israel. Pete Thamel, Young, 
Talented and Unsettled Playing Overseas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at SP1. Tyler intends to return 
for the 2011 NBA Draft. Id.; see also Pete Thamel, U.S. Basketball Prodigy Quits Israeli Pro Team, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2010, at D5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/20/sports/ 
basketball/20tyler.html. In November 2009, a former high-school phenom, Latavious Williams, chose 
to play in the National Basketball Development League, an NBA minor league, in lieu of attending 
college. Dan Shanoff, Making History Today: Latavious Williams, ESPN, Nov. 5, 2009, http:// 
espn.go.com/blog/truehoop/post/_/id/10386/making-history-today-latavious-williams. No player had 
ever before done so. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/5
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This Note will attempt to answer that question by ultimately arguing that a 
player could mount a winning legal argument against the NBA‘s age 
requirement. 
In Part I, this Note will briefly explain the history of the NBA‘s age 
rules and general attempts to regulate player eligibility. In Part II, the Note 
will chronicle previous attempts to challenge various eligibility 
requirements of the NBA and the partially analogous NFL by relying upon 
antitrust law. Highlighting the pertinent cases from the NBA and NFL 
arenas will provide a useful summary of the general legal doctrine 
governing this niche. Part III of the Note will examine the legal consensus 
regarding the likelihood of a successful challenge that has emerged since 
the NBA implemented its latest age requirement. This portion also will 
take up important questions of whether the litigation process would be so 
protracted that the petitioner would lose his standing, and why no one has 
yet sought to challenge the NBA if a legal remedy is available. Finally, 
Part IV of the Note will propose the avenue along which a prospective 
NBA draftee might likely pursue a successful contest. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NBA DRAFT AND LEAGUE ELIGIBILITY RULES 
Over the years, the NBA has relied upon a number of methods
23
 to 
regulate how amateurs join the League.
24
 In its early years, the Draft was 
protracted—teams would select tens of college players at a time, with 
selection order loosely determined by regular-season record.
25
 Seeking to 
grow its sport‘s popularity during the League‘s formative stages, the NBA 
also allowed for territorial picks from 1947
26
 through 1965.
27
 To make a 
 
 
 23. A draft has been a common framework, but rules for participation in the process have 
evolved over time. Most basically, drafts that distribute players across teams entail creating a pool of 
players from which franchises then take turns selecting. As the ensuing discussion will demonstrate, a 
draft can serve as a bottleneck through which all prospective new players must pass by imposing 
specific requirements upon those wishing to qualify for eligibility in the NBA and requiring 
participation in the draft pool. Similarly, draft rules can mandate that teams participating in the NBA 
adhere to prescribed procedures for acquiring talent. Given this schematic, a draft becomes the critical 
venue as a market where sellers (the players) and buyers (teams seeking talent) are united. It might 
also be thought of as a market where the teams are the sellers (of employment opportunity) and the 
players are the buyers. But as this Note will explore, the unique talent possessed by those with realistic 
desires to play in the NBA renders the former characterization a more accurate depiction. 
 24. McCann, supra note 18, at 129. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The NBA‘s first season spanned across 1946 and 1947, with the first draft held afterward. 
See generally Evolution of the Draft and Lottery, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/draft_ 
evolution.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010); Fulks’ Warriors Star in League’s First Season, NBA 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PLAYOFF EDITION, http://www.nba.com/history/season/19461947.html (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2010). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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territorial pick was to exchange a first-round draft choice for a player from 
an NBA team‘s ―immediate area.‖28 The NBA viewed this territoriality 
system as a means for cultivating a fan base by allowing member teams to 
populate their respective rosters with college players already prominent in 
their respective markets.
29
 
In 1966, the League revised its system, shifting its emphasis from 
regional-driven commercial growth to greater competition.
30
 Hoping to 
foster some modicum of parity, the NBA abolished territorial picks, 
distributed the first two picks in the Draft by asking the last-place finishers 
in each of the two League conferences to flip a coin,
31
 and allocated one 
pick per round to the remaining teams, which picked in an order inverse to 
their records.
32
 
A peril of the coin-flip system was that it provided an incentive for bad 
teams to lose as many games as possible with the hope of securing, at 
worst, the second pick in the Draft.
33
 To eradicate this practice and the 
attendant perception that the integrity of the competition was 
compromised,
34
 the NBA Draft switched to a lottery system before the 
1985 Draft.
35
 In this lottery system, all seven of the NBA teams that did 
not qualify for the playoffs were given an equal chance to secure the first 
pick of the Draft and have access to the best amateur talent.
36
 The NBA 
 
 
 27. Evolution of the Draft and Lottery, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/draft_evolution. 
html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 28. Id. The ―immediate area‖ concept was meant to capture teams selecting players who played 
for colleges in the same city or the same media market. For instance, the Boston Celtics used a 1956 
territorial draft pick to select Tom Heinsohn, who attended college at Holy Cross in Worcester, MA. 
Tom Heinsohn NBA & ABA Statistics, BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.basketball-
reference.com/players/h/heinsto01.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). Heinsohn was inducted into the 
Basketball Hall of Fame in 1986. Id. 
 29. See Evolution of the Draft and Lottery, supra note 27. 
 30. McCann, supra note 18, at 128–30. At the time, the Boston Celtics had emerged as a dynastic 
presence. The Celtics won eight consecutive NBA championships from 1959–1966. Celtics Win 
Eighth Straight as Auerbach Retires, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/season/19651966.html 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2010). Not only had a Celtics territorial pick, Tom Heinsohn, become an integral 
part of Boston‘s reign, but the NBA generally sought a means through which it could promote greater 
equality. It sought to foster a more competitive product and believed that changing the draft structure 
to better distribute talent was a means of accomplishing this goal. McCann, supra note 18, at 130. 
 31. The NBA divides teams into two conferences, the Eastern Conference and the Western 
Conference. See generally Team Index, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/teams/ (last visited Aug. 23, 
2010). 
 32. McCann, supra note 18, at 129; Evolution of the NBA Draft and Lottery, NBA.COM, 
http://www.nba.com/history /draft_evolution.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 33. McCann, supra note 18, at 130. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Evolution of the NBA Draft and Lottery, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/draft_ 
evolution.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 36. Id. The initial lottery format provided for the NBA commissioner to open seven 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/5
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has reimagined the lottery system in several subsequent iterations as the 
League has continued to refine the manner through which it can 
systematically promote equal competition.
37
 A constant amid this change, 
though, has been the Draft‘s primacy as the threshold that the best players 
must cross in order to join the NBA.
38
 
A series of collective bargaining agreements consummated among the 
NBA and the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) since 1964 
has preserved the Draft as the exclusive mechanism upon which an 
amateur of any real value must rely for entrance.
39
 An illustrative example 
is Article X of the current collective bargaining agreement (CBA), which 
clearly articulates that ―no player may sign a Contract or play in the NBA‖ 
unless he has been Draft eligible.
40
 Teams are free to sign undrafted 
players to contracts; however, these players enjoy little bargaining 
leverage because they are only available after having initially been judged 
to be inferior and unworthy of a draft pick.
41
 
Draft eligibility, like the Draft itself, has changed over the years.
42
 In 
accordance with the NBA‘s initial scheme for fan-base development, the 
first CBAs stipulated that no player was eligible for the NBA Draft until 
his college class graduated.
43
 The Supreme Court suspended this rule, 
pursuant to an antitrust challenge, in 1971.
44
 From 1971–2005, high-
school graduates were immediately eligible for the Draft.
45
 Then, the 2005 
CBA implemented the latest age requirement.
46
 As noted above, current 
American players
47
 are only draft eligible if they will turn nineteen during 
 
 
independently sealed envelopes, each filled with a different non-playoff-team‘s logo. Opening them in 
reverse order, the commissioner revealed a randomly selected draft order for the first seven picks of 
the first round. In subsequent rounds, teams picked in inverse relation to their respective records 
(which is also how playoff teams chose first-round selections). McCann, supra note 18, at 130–31. 
 37. See Evolution of the NBA Draft and Lottery, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/draft_ 
evolution.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). See generally McCann, supra note 18, at 131–34. 
 38. McCann, supra note 18, at 134. 
 39. Id. at 117, 134. 
 40. ARTICLE X, supra note 15, § 1(a). 
 41. McCann, supra note 18, at 134. 
 42. Andrew M. Jones, Hold the Mayo: An Analysis of the Validity of the NBA’s Stern No Preps 
to Pros Rule and the Application of the Nonstatutory Exemption, 26 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 475, 478 
(2006). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Haywood v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). This case will be discussed with 
greater detail in Part II of this Note. See infra notes 87–96. 
 45. See generally Evolution of the Draft and Lottery, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/history/ 
draft_evolution.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2010). 
 46. See generally McCann, supra note 18. 
 47. There are additional rules for international players who seek to join the NBA but have not 
gone through the American education system. An international player is Draft eligible if: (a) he will be 
at least twenty-two-years-old during the calendar year of the Draft; or (b) he will be nineteen-years-old 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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the calendar year of the Draft and if one year has elapsed since their high-
school class‘s graduation.48 Irrespective of their competency or 
preparation, the most-talented amateur basketball players—those like 
Garnett, Bryant, and James—seeking to maximize their ability and earning 
potential must play by the NBA‘s Draft rules.49 
NBA Commissioner David Stern was the most prominent advocate for 
the current age restrictions.
50
 When the latest eligibility regime was put in 
place, Stern argued that an age minimum helped to protect impressionable 
high-school talents from player agents and other third parties who may 
generally seek to exploit athletes for their own gain.
51
 Stern said that a 
year, or more, in college would help basketball players develop stronger 
skills on and off the court.
52
 Furthermore, he professed that the NBA was 
concerned with how it was viewed by fans who wanted players who could 
engage their local communities and comport themselves in a mature, 
responsible fashion that reflected positively upon the League.
53
 
Criticism of the NBA‘s latest age requirement has been wide ranging.54 
Under the auspices of protecting lesser high-school talents from a 
misguided decision to forgo college, the rule appears to wholly neglect the 
countervailing experiences of Garnett, Howard, and other prep-to-pros 
NBA players who have thrived.
55
 Far from an altruistic gesture, the 
minimum one-year eligibility interregnum appears to force college 
education upon a population that may not otherwise choose to pursue that 
path.
56
 Yet college is not compulsory for other groups of people.
57
 
Similarly, the age requirement arguably elevates the economic interests of 
universities and their corporate partners over those of the athletes by 
 
 
during the calendar year of the Draft and has signed a contract with a non-NBA professional team in 
the United States; or (c) he will be nineteen-years-old during the calendar year of the Draft and has 
expressed his desire to be selected in the Draft in writing at least sixty days prior to the Draft. See 
ARTICLE X, supra note 15, § 1 (b)(ii)(G). 
 48. Supra note 15. 
 49. McCann, supra note 18, at 134. 
 50. Jones, supra note 42, at 479. 
 51. Desmond Conner, Bynum Has a Test Left, HARTFORD COURANT, May 29, 2005, at E5. 
 52. Marc J. Spears, NBA Leaders: Q&A NBA, DENVER POST, Feb. 11, 2005, at D1. 
 53. Harvey Araton, There Are Different Ways to Season Raw Talent, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, 
at D1. 
 54. See infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. 
 55. Robertson, supra note 19. 
 56. William C. Rhoden, Growing to Appreciate the N.B.A.’s Age Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2007, at D3. 
 57. Supra notes 7, 22. Though playing abroad or in the NBA‘s developmental minor league are 
options that some players have embraced, these are still largely uncommon choices. Instead, most 
high-school players who want to continue playing basketball and maintain their skills are forced to 
attend college, where there is guaranteed competition and opportunity to play. 
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providing a strong incentive for prep stars to enroll in college for at least a 
season.
58
 Rather than earning a wage as professionals, players are forced 
into amateurism, forgoing income but nonetheless generating revenue for 
the colleges and universities whose basketball games are valuable 
commodities among broadcasters and merchandisers.
59
 
For an aspiring professional basketball player who would seek to 
challenge the 2005 eligibility rules and go straight from high school to the 
NBA, choosing among these far-reaching, varied criticisms is an important 
process. That is, it would be incumbent upon a qualified high-school 
basketball talent to mount the appropriate challenge to the rule, 
incorporating these arguments into an adequate legal framework. History 
is instructive in attempting to identify the appropriate legal path forward. 
II. PREVIOUS ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO ELIGIBILITY RULES IN THE 
NBA AND NFL 
The only other American sports league with a stringent age standard 
akin to the NBA‘s is the NFL.60 NBA and NFL requirements governing 
draft and participation eligibility have long, heavily litigious histories.
61
 
Examining the legal issues that fueled these cases helps to clarify what 
legal options remain available today. 
A. Antitrust and Collective Bargaining: An Overview 
Historically, those attempting to challenge NBA and NFL eligibility 
restrictions have alleged that the rules violate the antitrust law first enacted 
as the Sherman Act.
62
 The Sherman Act sought to eradicate restraints of 
trade
63
 and unlawful restrictions on freedom to contract.
64
 Analyzing 
 
 
 58. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 732–33. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Haywood v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (invalidating NBA‘s age 
requirement and prohibiting NBA from taking action against team that signed Spencer Haywood, who 
did not meet previous age requirement); Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(overturning lower court and upholding NFL age requirement for draft eligibility); Wood v. Nat‘l 
Basketball Ass‘n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding collectively bargained provisions that 
implemented a seniority system, reinforced draft process, limited salaries, and applied rules to 
prospective union members); Mackey v. Nat‘l Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (striking 
down unilateral rule established outside of collective bargaining, which limited player movement and 
salary); Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that NFL age-
eligibility rules were illegal restraint of trade); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., 325 F. Supp. 1049 
(C.D. Cal. 1971) (invalidating age-based NBA draft eligibility rules).  
 62. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 63. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911). 
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whether the Sherman Act has been violated requires that a court apply a 
―rule of reason‖ test when considering if a restraint is reasonable.65 The 
test inquires into whether the ―restraint imposed‖ promotes or destroys 
competition by weighing factors that include the details of the industry, 
the impact of a regulation on a specific party, the expected impact on the 
industry as a whole, and the circumstances that motivated the alleged 
restraint.
66
 Certain restraints, including group boycotts, may be deemed 
per se unreasonable, independent of any balancing.
67
 The majority of legal 
challenges against the NBA and NFL pursuant to antitrust claims have 
argued that league eligibility policies, such as age requirements, are 
tantamount to group boycotts.
68
 
Although finding group boycotts to be per se illegal, the Supreme 
Court nonetheless created an exception to the rule in 1963.
69
 Upon 
reaffirming that group boycotts are a per se violation of antitrust rules 
―absent any justification derived from the policy of another statute or 
otherwise,‖70 it went on to carve out a safe harbor for such concerted 
action.
71
 A group boycott will be permitted if: ―1) the collective action is 
required by the structure of the industry, 2) the restraint is reasonably 
implemented, and 3) the procedural safeguards exist ‗to prevent 
unnecessary and arbitrary application.‘‖72 An alleged restraint that passes 
this test will then be considered under rule-of-reason analysis.
73
 Later, in 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing 
Co.,
74
 the Court further limited findings of per se illegality if a petitioner 
failed to ―allege ‗that the challenged activity falls into a category likely to 
have predominantly anticompetitive effects.‘‖75 The circumscribed manner 
in which the Court now will apply its per se analysis means that a 
 
 
 64. McCann, supra note 18, at 141. 
 65. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238–39 (1918). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Fashion Originators‘ Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467–68 (1941). 
 68. See supra note 56; see also Jones, supra note 42, at 491. 
 69. Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 347–49 (1963). 
 70. Jones, supra note 42, at 489. 
 71. Silver, 373 U.S. at 347–50. 
 72. Jones, supra note 42, at 489 (quoting Peter Altman, Note, Stay Out for Three Years After 
High School or Play in Canada—And for Good Reason: An Antitrust Look at Clarett v. National 
Football League, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 569, 578 (2004)). 
 73. Jones, supra note 42, at 489–90. 
 74. 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985). 
 75. Jones, supra note 42, at 490 (quoting Nw. Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 298); see also 
Jones, supra note 42, at 490 n.152 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed‘n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458–59 
(1986) (―[T]he category of restraints classed as group boycotts is not to be expanded indiscriminately,‖ 
and ―we have been slow to . . . extend per se analysis to restraints imposed in the context of business 
relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.‖). 
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petitioner must demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, or else the alleged 
group boycott will be judged under rule-of-reason analysis.
76
 As noted, 
that analysis is an inexact calculus, which weighs multiple factors while 
assessing a specific economic sector.
77
 
The federal preference for collective bargaining has served as a 
countervailing weight in this area of jurisprudence; courts must honor both 
the Sherman Act‘s interest in protecting commerce and the policy benefits 
promoted by collective bargaining. When confronted by player allegations 
of illegal group boycotts, courts have had to balance the relative merits of 
the Sherman Act‘s free-commerce predisposition with the efficiency and 
harmony promoted by the latitude afforded collective bargaining.
78
 This 
public-policy deference toward collective bargaining can be seen in both 
the National Labor Relations Act
79
 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
80
 which, 
in tandem, help to insulate collectively bargained agreements from judicial 
antitrust scrutiny.
81
 However, these federal statutes did not cover CBAs 
struck through negotiation between unions and nonemployer third 
parties—such as sports leagues—as opposed to sports teams.82 To protect 
these compacts, the Supreme Court created what is commonly known as 
the ―nonstatutory exemption‖ to the Sherman Act.83 
Under the nonstatutory exemption, courts will allow restraints on trade 
―so long as such restraints operate primarily in a labor market 
characterized by collective bargaining.‖84 However, if the collective 
bargaining is not approved or protected by the nonstatutory exemption—if 
it is found to be a restraint on the business market, not specifically the 
labor market—antitrust law will apply.85 While the nonstatutory 
exemption has been addressed in the sports context, the exact scope of the 
rule is still unclear.
86
 
 
 
 76. Jones, supra note 42, at 490. 
 77. See supra note 63. 
 78. Jocelyn Sum, Note, Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 807, 810 
(2005).  
 79. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006). 
 80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115 (2006). 
 81. Milk Wagon Drivers‘ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prod., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 101–03 (1940). 
 82. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 
(1975). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 134 n.14 (2d Cir. 2004) (Clarett II) 
(quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), aff’d, 518 U.S. 231 
(1996). 
 85. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 125. 
 86. See Rhoden, supra note 56. 
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B. An Early Understanding of the Nonstatutory Labor Exemption in 
Sports 
Haywood v. National Basketball Association, decided in 1971, was the 
earliest of the prominent cases to challenge a court‘s application of these 
competing legal policies.
87
 Spencer Haywood was a high-school basketball 
star who played in college for two years before signing to play for the 
Denver Rockets of the American Basketball Association (ABA).
88
 
Haywood went on to shine in the ABA.
89
 When he turned twenty-one 
years old, still before his high-school class would have graduated from 
college, he claimed fraudulent inducement to break his Denver contract 
and accept one with the NBA‘s Seattle SuperSonics.90 Ultimately, the 
NBA threatened to void Haywood‘s contract with Seattle, claiming that he 
was ineligible to play in the NBA at the time he signed the contract 
because League rules stipulated that players were only eligible after their 
respective high-school classes had graduated from college.
91
 Haywood 
sued the League, claiming that its draft rules constituted a group boycott 
that violated the Sherman Act.
92
 
The Court issued an injunction that suspended the NBA‘s age 
requirement.
93
 Justice Douglas endorsed the district court‘s reasoning—the 
age requirement deprived players like Haywood of a chance to maximize 
their skills and earning potential by unduly restricting them during their 
athletic primacy.
94
 The case introduced the concept of challenging an age 
requirement.
95
 There is an important distinction to note, however: though 
the NBA had begun collectively bargaining with the players‘ union at the 
time that Haywood brought suit, the applicable age requirement in the case 
had not been originally adopted through the CBA.
96
 This Note will return 
to this critical detail in Part II.C below. 
 
 
 87. 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). 
 88. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1204–05. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. The age requirement was later ruled per se illegal by a lower court. Denver Rockets, 325 
F. Supp. at 1067. 
 94. Haywood, 401 U.S. at 1205–06. 
 95. McCann, supra note 18, at 131. 
 96. Jones, supra note 42, at 494 (―While Denver Rockets is significant, it is important to note that 
it dealt with a rule that was not the result of collective bargaining.‖). 
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C. The Mackey Test: A Framework for Applying the Nonstatutory 
Exemption 
Not long after Haywood, there was a critical NFL case that ran along a 
parallel legal track and set precedent for applying the nonstatutory 
exemption to sports. In Mackey v. National Football League,
97
 NFL 
players challenged the league‘s ―Rozelle Rule,‖98 which required a team 
signing a free agent to compensate the player's former team.
99
 ―If the 
teams could not agree on compensation, the commissioner could step in 
and award the disadvantaged team draft picks or players from the 
poaching team's roster.‖100 The players alleged that the commissioner's 
discretion embodied in the ―Rozelle Rule‖101 made teams hesitant to sign 
free agents.
102
 Persuaded by the players, the district court reasoned that 
fear of potentially surrendering too much compensation upon the 
commissioner‘s review of a free-agent signing would discourage owners, 
impeding the free movement of labor and resources.
103
 This was deemed 
an illegal restraint of trade.
104
 
In response to the players‘ position and the district court‘s ruling, the 
Eighth Circuit created a three-prong test to determine when the 
nonstatutory exemption could be invoked.
105
 The court inquired into 
whether: (1) the restriction ―primarily affect[ed] only the parties to the 
collective bargaining relationship‖; (2) federal labor policy was implicated 
only to exempt ―mandatory subject[s] of collective bargaining‖; and (3) 
the bargaining was conducted at arm‘s length.106 Using this analytical 
framework, the Eighth Circuit found that the Rozelle Rule failed the third 
prong because the commissioner had unilaterally implemented the rule.
107
 
Despite imposing ―significant restrictions on players,‖ the Rozelle Rule 
 
 
 97. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 98. Id. at 609. The rule was named for former NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle. 
 99. Id. at 609 n.1. 
 100. Jones, supra note 42, at 495. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 618 (―The district court found that the Rozelle Rule operates to 
significantly deter clubs from negotiating with and signing free agents. By virtue of the Rozelle Rule, a 
club will sign a free agent only where it is able to reach an agreement with the player‘s former team as 
to compensation, or where it is willing to risk the awarding of unknown compensation by the 
Commissioner. The court concluded that the Rozelle Rule, as enforced, thus constituted a group 
boycott and a concerted refusal to deal, and was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.‖). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 614. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 615–16. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
274 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 88:261 
 
 
 
 
was adopted and perpetuated without the scrutiny of bargaining among the 
affected parties.
108
 Rozelle‘s action improperly deprived the players of a 
quid-pro-quo relationship.
109
 Failing the test, the NFL lost the protection 
of the nonstatutory exemption, and the Rozelle Rule was found to be a 
violation of the Sherman Act.
110
 Reaching this decision, the court noted 
that Mackey was taking its place alongside other sports-focused and non-
sports-focused litigation that had been judged as antitrust violations for 
similar reasons.
111
 
In Wood v. National Basketball Association,
112
 the Mackey test was 
invoked when the court had to confront related questions in a basketball 
context.
113
 The NBA‘s Philadelphia 76ers drafted Leon Wood in 1984.114 
Due to League salary cap requirements, Philadelphia could only offer 
Wood a one-year contract for $75,000.
115
 However, it assured Wood that 
the team would ultimately enter into a long-term agreement with him for 
more money.
116
 Wood rejected this tender offer and the accompanying 
long-term promise, opting instead to sue the NBA.
117
 Wood claimed that 
the salary cap and draft structure ran afoul of the Sherman Act.
118
 
The Second Circuit ultimately heard Wood‘s case.119 Wood alleged that 
the NBA‘s college-draft system and rigid salary structure violated the 
Sherman Act.
120
 He argued that the governing strictures prevented him 
from achieving full market value, in violation of antitrust jurisprudence.
121
 
He also said that the NBA‘s policies unfairly disadvantaged new 
 
 
 108. Id. at 616. The court did not explicitly draw a connection to the Spencer Haywood cases, see 
supra notes 87–96; however, an obvious similarity among the circumstances in Mackey and those 
surrounding Haywood was that the age requirement that Haywood challenged had been implemented 
by the NBA outside of a collective bargaining agreement. 
 109. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 617–18 (citing cases). 
 112. Wood v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 526. 
 115. Id. at 526–27. At the time, the NBA had just implemented a salary cap, which provided that 
teams exceeding the cap could sign first-round draft picks to one-year contracts for a maximum of 
only $75,000. Philadelphia‘s salary obligations put it over the cap, so it offered Wood the deal 
prescribed by league rules, while attempting to preserve the ability to engage in the transactions 
necessary to enter into a long-term deal. Id. at 527 (―Williams asserts that Philadelphia was prepared to 
seek a way around the salary cap in order to negotiate a multi-year contract with Wood but could not 
get Slaughter to work out the terms.‖). 
 116. Id. at 527. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 526. 
 119. Wood v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 120. Id. at 956. 
 121. Id. at 959. 
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employees and were tantamount to an illegal seniority system.
122
 The 
Second Circuit rejected Wood's claims.
123
 It acknowledged the balancing 
demanded by antitrust and collective-bargaining considerations while 
upholding the federal policy preference for collective organization and the 
terms stipulated in the NBA‘s CBA.124 Disagreeing that the policies were 
illegal because they disadvantaged new employees, the Second Circuit 
held that seniority systems
125
 are the occasional legal results of various 
elements codified in collectively bargained agreements.
126
 Significantly, 
the court also rejected Wood‘s claim that, as a draftee, he was outside of 
the bargaining unit and, therefore, exempt from the terms of its CBA.
127
 
The court noted that it is commonplace for CBAs to impact workers 
beyond present members of the union
128
 at the time when a CBA is 
adopted.
129
 The Second Circuit concluded that Wood‘s claims had to be 
rejected because finding in his favor would subvert federal labor policy.
130
 
It acknowledged the Mackey case as one whose decision had a similar 
outcome.
131
 
D. The Evolution of Mackey Analysis in Recent Years 
Since Mackey, the Eighth Circuit‘s three-pronged nonstatutory test has 
become a common standard across circuits, and it has been applied in 
sports labor contexts akin to that presented in the Wood case.
132
 A notable 
 
 
 122. Id. at 960. 
 123. Id. at 962. 
 124. Id. at 961–62. 
 125. Id. at 960. The Second Circuit drew a parallel to industrial contexts, such as the automotive 
industry, where CBAs are common, while finding that collectively bargained terms of employment 
that tie promotions, layoffs, and salaries to seniority are legal. Id. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 960–61. 
 128. Id. at 960. Similar to its reasoning about seniority systems, see supra note 125, the Second 
Circuit ruled that in industrial contexts, legal CBAs are contemplated to apply to both those in the 
bargaining unit and future ―employees‖ who might later join the union. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960 
(―[N]ewcomers in the industrial context routinely find themselves disadvantaged vis-a-vis those 
already hired. A collective agreement may thus provide that salaries, layoffs, and promotions be 
governed by seniority . . . even though some individuals with less seniority would fare better if 
allowed to negotiate individually.‖). The court also reasoned that the National Labor Relations Act 
defines ―employee‖ in a manner that allows for this interpretation. Id. 
 129. Jones, supra note 42, at 500 (―Finally, the court rejected Mr. Wood‘s claim that he was 
outside the bargaining unit by noting that it is commonplace for CBAs to impact workers beyond 
members of the union signing the CBA.‖). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Wood, 809 F.2d at 962 n.6. 
 132. Kieran M. Corcoran, When Does the Buzzer Sound?: The Nonstatutory Labor Exemption In 
Professional Sports, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (1994); see also McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 
F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (applying Mackey in a hockey context). 
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development arose in the Second Circuit, though, as it arguably turned 
away from Mackey in a recent decision.
133
 Former Ohio State University 
running back Maurice Clarett sought to have the NFL‘s eligibility regime 
overturned as violative of the Sherman Act. He wanted to enter the draft 
earlier than allowed under the NFL‘s age requirement.134 After winning in 
district court,
135
 Clarett lost in front of the Second Circuit.
136
 Declining 
Clarett‘s request for relief, the circuit court reversed the district court, 
while rejecting the Mackey test.
137
 The Second Circuit declared that it has 
―never regarded the Eighth Circuit's test in Mackey as defining the 
appropriate limits of the nonstatutory exemption.‖138 The Circuit noted 
that the issue to decide was whether exposing the NFL draft eligibility 
rules to antitrust analysis would ―‗subvert fundamental principles of our 
federal labor policy.‘‖139 It answered affirmatively, invoking Mackey 
factors and broadening their scope, while nonetheless rejecting the formal 
test.
140
 
In effect, the Second Circuit deemed the conventional Mackey test too 
narrow and argued against the manner in which the test was applied 
commonly, while still considering its basic elements.
141
 Doing more to 
accommodate the federal preference for collective bargaining, the Second 
Circuit construed the idea of mandatory CBA subjects broadly,
142
 
capturing not only employment terms that are explicitly negotiated, but 
also those that implicate the negotiation of standard agreements.
143
 For 
example, the circuit dismissed Clarett‘s argument that the NFL‘s 
mandatory three-year waiting period between high school and draft 
eligibility was arbitrary and beyond the scope of a CBA by reasoning that 
draft eligibility implicates labor supply and job availability, drawing such 
a rule into the purview of a concerned bargaining unit.
144
 Cumulatively, 
the Second Circuit adopted a broader understanding of the Mackey factors 
 
 
 133. Jones, supra note 42, at 503. 
 134. Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Clarett I). NFL 
rules stipulate that a player is only eligible for the Draft three years after his high-school class has 
graduated. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004) (Clarett II). 
 137. Id. at 125. 
 138. Id. at 133. 
 139. Id. at 138 (quoting Wood v. Nat‘l Basketball Ass‘n, 809 F.2d 954, 959 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 140. Jones, supra note 42, at 504–05. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 141–43. 
 144. Id. 
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when assessing professional sports.
145
 The court reasoned that critical 
analysis of the unique working conditions in the NFL, and in other sports 
leagues, expanded the parameters of the nonstatutory labor exemption.
146
 
As such, it rejected a rigid adherence to Mackey and instead adopted a 
more capacious reading of the elements that must be considered when 
determining if antitrust violations have been committed.
147
 
III. SHOULD HIGH-SCHOOL PLAYERS ABANDON HOPE?  
EXISTING LEGAL CONSENSUS 
The Second Circuit‘s Clarett decision (―Clarett II‖)148 is the most 
recent and most prominent case from the line of antitrust challenges 
brought against the NBA and NFL. The Second Circuit was critical of the 
Mackey test,
149
 and its broad opinion has led several commentators to 
question whether an aspiring basketball player could reasonably hope to 
win an age-requirement case.
150
 Some legal observers who think a 
successful challenge is unlikely cite the Clarett II decision‘s unique legal 
analysis as their reason.
151
 Others believe that the case expanded the 
application of the nonstatutory exemption under Mackey, regardless of the 
Second Circuit‘s language challenging the test‘s preeminence.152 Those 
who disagree and believe that challenging the NBA‘s age requirement 
remains a viable prospect have argued that the NBA and NFL are not fully 
analogous,
153
 primarily because there is a growing body of evidence that 
supports the efficacy of high-school players entering the NBA upon 
graduation.
154
 Both sides of this discussion are explored below. So, too, 
are questions about why no one has yet to challenge the NBA, and how the 
landscape might change should a court ever return to the recently decided 
 
 
 145. See supra note 140. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 124. 
 149. Id. at 133. 
 150. Jones, supra note 42, at 510. 
 151. Id. at 511. 
 152. Id. at 511–13 
 153. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 757. This symposium piece suggests several reasons 
why there may be optimism on behalf of prospective early entrants into the NBA who would seek to 
challenge the rules. The article is half scholarly research and half author dialogue captured at the 
symposium. This is notable because several ideas shared at the discussion are supported by the 
accompanying research; however, it is an admittedly attenuated connection in the context of the paper. 
Id. at 745. 
 154. Id. at 754. 
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antitrust question about whether a sports league and its member teams can 
be regarded as a single entity. 
For those who believe that Clarett II foreclosed or significantly 
impaired the possibility of successfully challenging the NBA age 
requirement,
155
 the Second Circuit‘s decisions to not only reject the 
Mackey analysis of the lower court (―Clarett I‖),156 but also to defend 
vigorously the federal labor policy protected by application of the 
nonstatutory exemption, are compelling reasons.
157
 Clarett II rejected the 
district court‘s opinion that draft-eligibility rules are not covered by any of 
the three Mackey prongs.
158
 Instead, the circuit court found traditional 
Mackey analysis to yield a certain myopia that it discarded in lieu of 
considering how the facts of the case could be reconciled with standing 
federal policy.
159
 The circuit concluded that draft-eligibility rules can be 
considered a part of the collective-bargaining process.
160
 It also noted that 
to find such rules to be unlawful concerted action would undermine the 
preference for bargaining, the freedom of bargaining units to contract, and 
―the widespread use of multi-employer bargaining units.‖161 Clarett II 
provided a strong, direct statement that CBAs governing professional 
sports advance the federal government‘s preference for that form of labor 
relations.
162
 According to this Second Circuit reasoning, a challenge to the 
NBA‘s Article X would be a difficult case to win.163 
Others who regard challenging the NBA‘s age requirement as a losing 
proposition point to Clarett II precisely because of how it treats 
Mackey.
164
 Rather than focusing on the court‘s criticism, a careful reading 
of the opinion yields that the Second Circuit nonetheless cleaved to the 
general categories that the Mackey test considers.
165
 In doing so, the 
 
 
 155. Jones, supra note 42, at 510. 
 156. Christian Dennie, From Clarett to Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption Argument 
Continues, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 63, 77 (2007). 
 157. See Jones, supra note 42, at 513; Pitts, supra note 14, at 443. 
 158. Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that the district 
court had relied upon the Eighth Circuit‘s Mackey analysis to find an age requirement beyond 
collective bargaining before reprimanding: ―We, however, have never regarded the Eighth Circuit‘s 
test in Mackey as defining the appropriate limits of the non-statutory exemption.‖). 
 159. Id. at 134–36. 
 160. Id. at 134–35. 
 161. Id. at 135. 
 162. Jones, supra note 42, at 506; McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 762. Additionally, it is 
worthwhile to consider the Second Circuit‘s own reasoning—it identified other cases in which a strong 
preference for collective bargaining was upheld to grant greater latitude to such agreements. See 
Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 134 n.14 (citing cases). 
 163. Jones, supra note 42, at 510. 
 164. Id. at 503. 
 165. Id. 
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Second Circuit may have broadened the scope of permissible conduct that 
would pass Mackey scrutiny and allow for the lawful application of the 
nonstatutory exemption.
166
 Specifically, the court said that prospective 
employees (amateur players) were contemplated as part of the bargaining 
unit when the CBA was consummated;
167
 that draft eligibility can be 
connected to wages and job availability, bringing eligibility requirements 
into the range of issues that are the typical subjects of collective 
bargaining;
168
 and that even rules incorporated implicitly were considered 
to be appropriately negotiated when they accompanied an otherwise lawful 
arm‘s-length agreement.169 By criticizing Mackey but nonetheless fitting 
more permissible conduct into its framework, the court may have allowed 
for a broader application of the test that more widely protects concerted 
activity undertaken while collectively bargaining.
170
 
Despite the law‘s strong preference for collective bargaining and the 
latitude under the nonstatutory exemption that draft-eligibility rules are 
afforded, not all observers approach a potential age-requirement contest 
with the same wariness.
171
 Proponents of challenging the NBA‘s age 
requirement believe that the substantial success enjoyed by high-school 
prodigies upon arriving in the League provides tangible evidence that was 
absent when the Clarett II court contemplated the impact of overturning 
the NFL‘s age requirement.172 They argue that the athletic and commercial 
success enjoyed by Garnett, James, Bryant, and players of that ilk is 
distinct;
173
 that the absence of an adequate substitute unfairly impairs their 
earning potential;
174
 and that the primacy of the NBA as the premier 
basketball venue makes these players uniquely situated.
175
 Similarly, while 
federal labor policy may generally encourage collective bargaining, and 
while it may prefer a liberal construal of the nonstatutory exemption, there 
is a material difference between labor negotiations in a field of equally 
situated competitors (such as the automotive industry) and a field in which 
there is only one de facto employer (as in basketball and the NBA).
176
 
 
 
 166. Id. at 516. 
 167. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 140–41. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 141–43. 
 170. Jones, supra note 42, at 516. 
 171. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 756–58. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Michael McCann, Legal Aftermath of the New NBA Age Limit, SPORTS LAW BLOG, Jan. 4, 
2006, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/01/legal-aftermath-of-new-nba-age-limit.html. 
 174. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 757. 
 175. See generally McCann, supra note 18. 
 176. McCann, supra note 173.  
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Proponents of challenging the NBA‘s Article X believe that some circuits 
may be more amenable to a challenge than others,
177
 and that despite the 
Second Circuit‘s ruling in Clarett II, an aspiring NBA player might argue 
that the age requirement purposely and exclusively addresses individuals 
who are not members of the bargaining unit.
178
 
Amid these mixed opinions about the legal efficacy of challenging the 
NBA‘s Article X, the rule has been free of formal contest since it was 
ratified in 2005.
179
 Some likely impediments are readily apparent. Where a 
case brought in the Second Circuit—which has already protected the 
nonstatutory exemption with a forceful and broad decision—or another 
circuit inclined to adopt that reasoning, a court might easily cleave to 
precedent and rule against the challenge.
180
 In such a jurisdiction, the court 
might adopt the Clarett II reasoning and find that whichever elements of 
the challenge were argued to be differentiating did not properly 
demonstrate any sort of illegal concerted activity.
181
 For instance, a court 
following the Second Circuit would likely find that age eligibility 
primarily affected parties to the collective bargaining agreement because 
eligibility for a fixed number of jobs is directly tied to working conditions 
of the extant workforce; that eligibility to work is a threshold question that 
makes it a mandatory subject of employment; and that any CBA 
consummated by a union and a multiemployer unit, like a sports league, 
would be achieved at arm‘s length. Similarly, there may not yet have been 
a high-school player both talented enough to harbor realistic aspirations
182
 
 
 
 177. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 756–57. In particular, the Sixth Circuit has been cited as 
a jurisdiction in which Article X might fail to earn the nonstatutory exemption. Id. There is no clearly 
articulated reason why the Sixth Circuit appears particularly amenable, though. Id. 
 178. Id. at 757. See also McCann, supra note 173. 
 179. There is no recognized case of a player challenging the NBA age requirement since it was 
adopted in 2005. 
 180. Pitts, supra note 14, at 446–51. 
 181. Id. 
 182. No literature definitively argues which evidence a petitioner would have to adduce to prove 
his basketball competency or the likelihood of his success. However, several pieces of scholarship 
have discussed the higher success rate and earning potential of gifted high-school players, relative to 
those who enroll in college and take a more traditional path to the NBA. See generally McCann, supra 
note 18, at 143–73; Pitts, supra note 14, at 573–74; Nicholas E. Wurth, The Legality of an Age-
Requirement in the National Basketball League After the Second Circuit’s Decision in Clarett v. NFL, 
3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (2005). Oft-cited statistics meant to demonstrate the 
unique position of prep phenoms include the average earnings of players such as LeBron James and 
Kobe Bryant, and the on-court success that players have achieved. See supra notes 4, 9. In McCann‘s 
Illegal Defense, he also produced data that demonstrated the markedly increased earning power of 
high-school players. McCann, supra note 18, at 164–73. His data showed that even when players who 
went straight from high school to the NBA and then failed were included in averages for high-school 
players, the average salary of prep-to-pros players was nearly identical to those of players who often 
had five- and six-year head starts. Id. at 165. He argued for the competency of the high-school players 
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of replicating the success enjoyed by Garnett and his cohorts, and also 
situated in a forum or jurisdiction that would allow for fresh consideration 
of the issues entailed in challenging the age requirement.
183
 Trepidation 
engendered by the cost of litigation and a presumption of likely defeat also 
may have dissuaded such a situated player in the first place.
184
 
Another issue for consideration is that perhaps no one has challenged 
the rule because the legal procedure entailed in doing so would be 
sufficiently protracted to render the ultimate judgment moot. Due to 
concerns about standing and ripeness, a prospective prep-to-pros 
basketball player would likely not file a lawsuit challenging the age 
requirement until he had completed his junior year of high school.
185
 From 
the time of filing until a final, post-appeal decision,
186
 the case could take 
months or years. When Maurice Clarett sought to challenge the NFL‘s 
decision, he filed his case in September, preceding the draft in which he 
sought to participate.
187
 His case was not finally decided by the Second 
Circuit until the end of May in the following year, roughly a month after 
the NFL held the draft on which Clarett had set his sights.
188
 
Maurice Clarett was a celebrated and decorated college athlete.
189
 
When he left high school and enrolled at Ohio State University, he was 
touted as an elite football prospect.
190
 In his first season, he helped lead his 
team to an undefeated campaign and a national championship.
191
 Despite 
his notoriety and the general time sensitivity of his request, Clarett‘s case 
did not receive special treatment. Though just conjecture, it seems 
 
 
and also for the premium that is placed on joining the NBA as soon as possible. Id. at 224. Removing 
from the average high-school wages those players who were not in the NBA for a meaningful amount 
of time placed the high-school-player‘s average well above a normal player‘s. Id. at 165–66.  
 183. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 767. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. 
 186. Clarett initially filed his challenge on September 23, 2003. Complaint, Clarett v. Nat‘l 
Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 03 Civ. 7441). The Second Circuit 
decision in his case was issued on May 24, 2004. Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 124 
(2d Cir. 2004) (Clarett II). The 2004 NFL Draft was held on April 24–25, 2004. Judy Battista, 
Rebuilding, Jets Fill Lineup with Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2004, at D4; Lynn Zinser, Manning’s 
Day Gets Miles Better After a Trade to the Giants, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at 8–1. 
 187. Complaint, Clarett v. Nat‘l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 03 
Civ. 7441). 
 188. Clarett II, 369 F.3d at 124. 
 189. See McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 740; see also Buckeyes Upset Miami in Double-OT, 
Fiesta Bowl Thriller, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 4, 2003, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/foot 
ball/college/2002/bowls/news/2003/01/03/fiesta_bowl_ap/. 
 190. Gary Housteau, Clarett Enrolled, Raring to Go at OSU, RIVALS.COM, Jan. 14, 2002, http:// 
footballrecruiting.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=75085. 
 191. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 740. 
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reasonably fair to assume that a high-school basketball player‘s petition to 
enter the NBA Draft before meeting its eligibility requirements would be 
treated similarly to Clarett‘s case.192 Were a petition filed in July, the 
Clarett case suggests that a final determination might not be made until 
January, at the earliest. The NBA Draft, annually held in late June, 
requires entrants to formally declare their desire for inclusion by the 
middle of May in the same calendar year.
193
 This would leave a four-
month window for a prospect to receive a judgment and, potentially, 
prepare for the draft. Were there delays during the litigation process, that 
window would begin to close. 
If a decision were delayed until after the targeted draft, the challenge 
would be moot, both practically and legally. At that point, the prospective 
player would not be eligible to join the NBA until the following year, 
when he would have first become eligible had he not challenged the age 
requirement.
194
 
Recently, a variable that could affect any analysis of a challenge to 
sports-league age requirements
195
 was introduced by American Needle v. 
National Football League.
196
 Arguing before the Supreme Court, clothing 
manufacturer American Needle asserted that the NFL is a collection of 
thirty-two individual teams, and that the league‘s exclusive merchandise 
contract with the rival manufacturer Reebok was tantamount to an illegal 
group boycott under the Sherman Act.
197
 The NFL countered that it was 
actually a single entity and, therefore, did not fall under Sherman Act 
scrutiny because a single entity cannot collude with itself.
198
 The Court 
rejected the NFL‘s single-entity argument199 and found that the exclusive 
merchandise contract was illegal concerted activity.
200
 
 
 
 192. Id. A prospective early draft entrant would have to argue that he was ready to play, and he 
might claim that the rules unfairly discriminated against someone outside of the bargaining unit. 
Clarett, though a football player, might provide a useful template because his arguments were wide-
reaching and his case prominently implicated the larger questions of sports-league eligibility. Id. 
 193. ARTICLE X, supra note 15. 
 194. Id. 
 195. See Order Granting Motion for Oral Argument, Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat‘l Football League, 
130 S. Ct. 1036 (Dec. 14, 2009) (No. 08-661); see also Gabriel A. Feldman, American Needle and the 
NFL’s Single Entity Argument, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan 2, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
gabriel-a-feldman/american-needle-and-the-n_b_409532.html. 
 196. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat‘l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010). 
 197. Id. at 2207.  
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 2214–15. 
 200. Id. at 2215. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss1/5
  
 
 
 
 
2010] TREMENDOUS UPSIDE POTENTIAL 283 
 
 
 
 
Legal commentators did not expect the Court to issue a broad ruling 
that granted the NFL absolute status as a single entity;
201
 however, such a 
ruling was a possibility.
202
 Had the NFL been deemed a single entity, it 
would have been exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act, 
and this would have had far-reaching implications beyond merchandise.
203
 
Particularly pertinent, deeming the NFL—or another sports league, such as 
the NBA—to be a single entity would functionally preclude antitrust 
challenges to eligibility rules, free-agency rules, and any other regulations 
that might constitute anticompetitive violations within the existing legal 
framework.
204
 The NBA, Major League Baseball, and several other 
interested parties filed amici curiae briefs in support of a broad single-
entity ruling.
205
 If the Supreme Court had determined that the NFL were a 
single entity, the league was not likely to have subsequently alienated its 
players and fans by unreasonably wielding its power to slash salaries, end 
free agency, and impose undue requirements.
206
 However, the possibility 
would have existed, due to the exemption from antitrust scrutiny.
207
 Given 
the argument that the NBA might be more deserving of single-entity 
status, this issue may arise again in the future.
208
 
 
 
 201. Gabriel A. Feldman, What We Learned from the Supreme Court about American Needle v. 
NFL, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 14, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gabriel-a-feldman/what-we-
learned-about-ame_b_424106.html. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Michael McCann, Why American Needle-NFL Is Most Important Case in Sports History, 
SI.COM, Jan. 12, 2010, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_mccann/01/12/American 
needlev.nfl/index.html. 
 204. Feldman, supra note 201; McCann, supra note 203; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Antitrust Case Has 
Implications Far Beyond N.F.L., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/ 
01/07/antitrust-case-has-implications-far-beyond-nfl/. 
 205. McCann, supra note 203. For additional discussion of single-entity status, the NBA‘s specific 
interest, and whether it would have a stronger case for the designation than the NFL, see Michael A. 
McCann, American Needle v. NFL: An Opportunity to Reshape Sports Law, 119 YALE L.J. 726 
(2010); Michael A. McCann, The NBA and the Single Entity Defense: A Better Case?, 1 HARV. J. 
SPORTS & ENT. L. 40 (2010). 
 206. McCann, supra note 203. 
 207. Id. This piece provides a helpful overview of the intersecting legal issues that were captured 
by the case, as they were far reaching and sometimes subtle. A pertinent excerpt illustrated the point: 
Depending upon the ruling, leagues may be able to avoid the threat of Section 1 scrutiny 
when they sign exclusive contracts with sponsors and licensees . . . , when they utilize league-
owned television channels to remove games from free television . . . , and when they limit the 
autonomy of individual franchises . . . . 
 Most dramatically . . . the Supreme Court could affirm the Seventh Circuit and extend 
single entity recognition to matters that include those normally subject to collective 
bargaining, such as players‘ salaries, free agency rights, and age eligibility restrictions. 
Leagues could therefore unilaterally restrain players‘ employment . . . .‖ 
Id. 
 208. McCann, supra note 205. 
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IV. HOW TO BRING A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE 
There appears to be a limited opportunity for a prospective prep-to-pros 
basketball player to challenge Article X of the NBA‘s collective 
bargaining agreement. First, the right player would have to emerge. 
Gauging the future success of any prospective draftee is difficult and 
inherently speculative.
209
 However, the United States has an entrenched 
basketball infrastructure that unites the high-school, college, and 
professional ranks
210
 in a manner such that truly elite players are identified 
and well known.
211
 The right player would then need to file suit in the 
right circuit. As discussed above, the Second Circuit would be an 
inhospitable venue for challenging the NBA‘s age requirement, given its 
jurisprudence in Clarett II.
212
 However, a challenge could be brought in a 
circuit that uses the Mackey analysis to judge when to apply the 
nonstatutory exemption.
213
 
To successfully win in front of a court applying the Mackey test, the 
petitioner would be best served by showing that Article X is a 
discriminatory rule that purposely targets individuals who are outside of 
the NBPA bargaining unit.
214
 This is the most likely avenue of success. 
Though Clarett II and other authority have permitted CBAs to reinforce 
seniority systems,
215
 the NBA‘s rule may be a particularly unfair 
 
 
 209. See, e.g., Ian Thomsen, Weekly Countdown: 2010 Draft Class Looks Weak Beyond Big 
Three, SI.COM, Jan. 22, 2010, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/ian_thomsen/01/22/count 
down.top.draft.prospects/index.html. 
 210. For a general overview of the relationship among organized high-school, college, and 
professional basketball, see Laurie A. Richter & Gail Kearns, PUT ME IN, COACH: A PARENTS‘ GUIDE 
to WINNING the GAME of COLLEGE RECRUITING (Right Fit Press 2009). Additionally, it should be 
noted that there is a vast, year-round secondary system for prep basketball called Amateur Athletic 
Union (AAU). See AMATEUR ATHLETIC UNION, http://www.aausports.org/ (last visited Aug. 23, 
2010). AAU events are open to member teams, and member teams are created independently of 
schools. The importance of AAU events in basketball has grown exponentially in recent years. See, 
e.g., Tommy Craggs, The Next Big Thing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/ 
11/02/sports/playmagazine/112sidney.html; Ray Fittipaldo, AAU Basketball: They Start as Early as 
Age 8 and Meet the Nation’s Best, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 14, 2006, http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/06134/690009-175.stm; Michelle Kaufman, College Basketball Recruiting Enters 
Halls of Middle School, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 3, 2009, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/south 
florida/v-fullstory/story/884969.html. It is common for the best high-school players to travel around 
the country participating in AAU tournaments against other elite players. Fittipaldo, supra. This 
process aids scouts and enhances the information that is exchanged across the different levels of 
basketball. Fittipaldo, supra. 
 211. See, e.g., supra note 202. 
 212. See supra notes 147–61 and accompanying text. 
 213. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 756–57. 
 214. Id. at 757. 
 215. Supra note 108. 
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imposition. It mandates a one-year gap between high-school graduation 
and draft eligibility, so it is arguably a much weaker protection for 
incumbent players in the bargaining unit than that offered by the three-
year buffer in the NFL.
216
 
Demonstrating the difference between the NBA and NFL‘s respective 
waiting periods may undermine the logic that the Second Circuit used 
when arguing that the collective-bargaining system is permitted to protect 
the incumbent labor force, because Article X offers little protection. 
Further, unlike the NFL, the NBA is populated by stars who have already 
directly transitioned from high school to professional basketball.
217
 This 
highlights the discriminatory nature of the age requirement: there is a class 
of individuals who can otherwise succeed in the NBA that is barred from 
doing so and forced into a series of inferior options,
218
 including 
compulsory education or overseas migration.
219
 The record of success 
established by prep-to-pros basketball players—such as Garnett, Bryant, 
and James—suggests that basketball players are less like NFL players and 
more analogous to tennis players and golfers, professionals who are 
unimpeded by such rigid age restrictions.
220
 Persuasively arguing these 
points could lead a properly selected court to find that Article X violates 
the first prong of the Mackey test, as the age requirement primarily affects 
those who are not parties to the bargaining unit.
221
 
 
 
 216. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 755–57. 
 217. Id. at 757. 
 218. Jeremy Tyler returned early from Israel, before completing one full season. Thamel, supra 
note 22. Tyler was dissatisfied with his playing time and found the transition to living abroad difficult. 
Tyler Quits Maccabi with Five Weeks Left, ESPN.COM, Mar. 20, 2010, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/ 
news/story?id=5008825. If Tyler can continue working out and playing basketball in some capacity, 
his draft status is unlikely to be affected. Id. The NBA age requirement forecloses his best option, 
which would be attempting to join an NBA team. Id. 
 219. Supra note 22. While attending college may offer actual benefits to individual players—
education, job skills, and a commonly recognized credential—it is an inferior option when assessed in 
a purely basketball-focused scheme. College offers a lower level of competition and does not allow for 
economic compensation. 
 220. See supra note 6. A useful follow-up inquiry would be to compare the earning potential of 
professional golfers and tennis players outside of the professional organizations that they can join 
freely after high school. Like the NBA, the Professional Golfers Association and the Association of 
Tennis Professionals are the premier and preeminent venues for their respective sports. No other 
league or organizing entity can offer the same exposure, popularity, or compensation. Accordingly, if 
this ―comparable worth‖ study were undertaken scientifically, it might be a persuasive, dispositive 
piece of evidence. In other fields, these sorts of comparative-worth studies have been conducted to 
build cases for bias and discrimination in the workplace. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. 
Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Depending on the findings of this sort of study, perhaps there would be a 
demographic slant to the results that might argue for some kind of unintended discrimination, as well. 
 221. McCann & Rosen, supra note 16, at 757. 
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An aspiring NBA player also might attempt to challenge Article X as 
an unlawful group boycott, pursuant to the reasoning in the Denver 
Rockets case.
222
 In Denver Rockets, the court assessed the prevailing NBA 
rule that a player had to be out of high school for four years before earning 
draft eligibility.
223
 Issuing an injunction that allowed Spencer Haywood to 
play for the NBA‘s Seattle SuperSonics, the court held that the eligibility 
requirement was a group boycott and per se illegal.
224
 The court reasoned 
that the League-wide rule was absolute and inflexible.
225
 To challenge the 
current rule, a player might attempt to argue something similar—Article X 
is rigid in its requirements and does not provide for any adequate relief. 
The Denver Rockets decision said that because the NBA eligibility 
regime did not make exceptions for players who could demonstrate 
economic hardship to a persuasive enough degree, it was unlawfully 
inflexible.
226
 The court found that there was no realistic economic 
alternative to the NBA, and that proving sufficient hardship would allow 
someone with unique skills to pursue the career path which would best 
reward that talent.
227
 There is an analogous argument to be made today.
228
 
As noted,
229
 the alternatives available to gifted basketball players barred 
from entering the NBA Draft are markedly inferior and do not offer the 
same compensation.
230
 The decreased earning potential of a player who 
must delay his NBA career is striking.
231
 A player challenging Article X 
would likely want to present the compelling economic evidence
232
 and 
buttress his argument by returning to some of the data that would be 
employed to challenge Article X as violative of the Mackey test‘s first 
prong.
233
 
As discussed earlier,
234
 the barrier over which a petitioner must pass to 
earn a designation of per se illegality is now greater than when Spencer 
Haywood first challenged the NBA‘s age requirement.235 Pursuant to the 
 
 
 222. Wurth, supra note 182, at 124. 
 223. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 1971).  
 224. Id. at 1066. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. See generally McCann, supra note 18. 
 229. See supra notes 116–43. 
 230. See generally McCann, supra note 18, at 214–15. 
 231. Id. at 115. 
 232. Id. at 164–69. 
 233. Wurth, supra note 182, at 124. 
 234. See supra notes 64–71. 
 235. See supra notes 62–86. 
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Supreme Court‘s decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers236 and 
subsequent jurisprudence, a petitioning high-school player would have to 
show that: (1) Article X is a collective action not required by the structure 
of the basketball industry, (2) Article X is a restraint unreasonably 
implemented, and (3) there are no procedural safeguards preventing 
unnecessary and arbitrary application.
237
 To attack these prongs, a 
petitioner might rely upon reasoning from the Denver Rockets case, 
despite the since-elevated per se threshold. In that case, the court noted 
that the rule-of-reason analysis that replaces per se designation is a 
complicated process when assessing basketball.
238
 That court feared such a 
balancing act would require ―lengthy factual inquiries and very subjective 
policy decisions,‖ which exceed judicial capacity.239 Given the strong 
economic argument a high-school player can make,
240
 and given the 
detailed nature of assessing the quality of alternative options necessitated 
by Article X,
241
 a basketball prodigy might argue that, as in Denver 
Rockets, rule-of-reason balancing is a ―lengthy factual inquir[y]‖242 ill 
suited for courts.  
Investigating whether the public-policy preference for collective 
bargaining and against per se findings, which might be the NBA‘s ultimate 
legal bulwark,
243
 outweighs the economic injury incurred by high-school 
players would likely require ―a complex economic inquiry‖ that a court 
may not welcome.
244
 The court ―would be required to determine a standard 
which could be used to weigh the various public policy goals which might 
be alleged as justification by the NBA. The court would further be forced 
to determine whether the boycott was genuinely motivated by the purposes 
given, or by other reasons.‖245 The value of a basketball career shortened 
by Article X and the options available to those barred from participating in 
the NBA immediately upon graduation are heavily debated subjects.
246
 So, 
too, are the motivations behind Article X.
247
 A court could assess all of 
these variables, consider the history of per se analysis, and determine that 
 
 
 236. 472 U.S. 284, 298 (1985). 
 237. 472 U.S. 284; Jones, supra note 42, at 489 
 238. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1063 (C.D. Cal. 1971). 
 239. Id. 
 240. See generally McCann, supra note 18, at 115, 214–15. 
 241. See supra notes 116–43. 
 242. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063. 
 243. See generally Jones, supra note 42; McCann & Rosen, supra note 16; Wurth, supra note 182. 
 244. Denver Rockets, 325 F. Supp. at 1063. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See supra note 22. 
 247. See supra note 21. 
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the substantial debate over Article X and its disputed efficacy may 
strongly argue for a finding of group boycott. 
CONCLUSION 
A talented high-school basketball player with a desire to continue in 
the line of prep-to-pros athletes should challenge Article X of the NBA‘s 
collective bargaining agreement. By pursuing a case in the proper 
jurisdiction, a prospective NBA sensation could argue that neither a 
Mackey analysis nor a policy in favor of collective bargaining can 
reasonably foreclose the unique opportunity now denied due to the age 
requirement. Admittedly, victory would not be assured, but there is a 
credible legal case to be made. And no prodigious basketball talent has 
ever shied away from a crucial shot, no matter how long. 
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